THE FAIR ACT: WHAT DOES IT ALL MEAN? by Ray, Daryll E.
THE FAIR ACT: WHAT DOES IT ALL MEAN?
Daryll E. Ray
Agricultural Policy Analysis  Center, University of Tennessee
I appreciate  the opportunity  to talk with you today. I have long admired the
work of the National Public Policy Education Committee. The committee's annual
conferences and published proceedings have enriched the public policy Extension
and research programs of countless policy educators. Thank you for making me  a
part of this year's conference.
I'd like to talk about six general topics: (1) Without attempting to chronicle the
events leading to the 1996 Federal Agriculture Improvement and Reform Act (FAIR),
I want to highlight a few of the more important forces that influenced the process and
content  of the  legislation-especially  those  forces  and  events  that  may  have  an
impact on future legislative actions and debates.  (2)  I will present our estimates  of
the acreage, price and income impacts of the new bill. (3) These and other economic
indicators will be tracked through 2004 and their projected levels compared to results
of the assumption the 1990 legislation was extended. (4) I will discuss program crop
exports,  especially the changes  in exports seen since  1980 and the extent to which
assumptions about exports could affect the profitability of agriculture in years ahead.
(5)  I will touch briefly on environmental  policy and expected  changes  in the way
farm-level environmental regulations are implemented. (6) Finally,  I will spend some
time talking about how the new act could affect your role as public policy educators.
Forces  Behind  the FAIR
Usually, changes in farm legislation are heavily influenced by the economic
setting of agriculture just prior to the scheduled termination of a particular piece of
farm legislation.  In the years prior to discussions on the  1996 farm bill, portions of
agriculture experienced drought, floods and significant price variability. Still, for the
most part, agriculture's economic health this time around was relatively robust and
stable (Ray and Frederick).
Thus, it was the political environment surrounding the early farm bill debate
that dominated all else (Orden et al. 1996a, 1996b). The overriding political sentiment
favored  less  governmental  regulation  and lower  federal  deficits.  This  sentiment
pervaded all legislative debate-especially after the 1992 election left the GOP with
control  of both  houses  of Congress.  But, the  debate  environment  also  included
political pressures and criticisms specific to agricultural  legislation.
*  A Convergence  ofInterests. Farmers wanted less bureaucratic interference
in their  decisionmaking.  Yet,  regional  differences  and  general  paralysis  due  to
confusion  over what was politically  feasible  kept production  agriculture  interests
from reaching a consensus on a direction for agricultural policy.
75Agribusiness, on the other hand, knew exactly what it wanted:  elimination of
all farm program provisions that reduce agricultural production and thus the volume
of storable commodities reaching the market. For agribusiness interests to achieve
success  in the policy  process,  the acreage  reduction program,  the  0/92  and other
programs affecting short-term production would have to be eliminated. Buffer-stock
programs, including the Farmer-Owned Grain Reserve, would have to be mothballed.
Agribusiness  also  strongly  argued for  the  release  of the  least environmentally
sensitive acreage in the Conservation Reserve Program (CRP)-although somewhat
less forcefully than it argued for elimination of short-term supply controls.
A coalition of ag-related companies-all of whom are affected by the volume
of farm inputs  sold or by  the volume  of farm products transported,  processed  or
marketed-was quite effective in using commissioned studies and the media to get
its views before the public. And, in the end, the agribusiness community got most of
what it wanted, making it perhaps the most influential lobby affecting what ultimately
became the Federal Agriculture Improvement and Reform Act of 1996.
Others were critical of farm programs for different reasons. Many-especially
those most committed  to reducing government  expenditures-criticized  previous
farm legislation for its lack of a cap on expenditures.  Even though annual deficiency
payments were capped by payment-rate maximums and production-coverage  limits,
budget estimates  were  based on  average  weather and demand conditions  and on
their associated estimated prices.  Hence, because payment rates vary inversely with
prices, lower-than-expected prices ballooned agricultural spending-which frustrated
budget planners and exasperated  budget  cutters.
Also, a large  group wanted to reform farm policy completely.  Many in this
group believed farm programs were anachronistic  and, therefore, unnecessary. They
pointed to the  changes  in:  (1) farm numbers;  (2)  agriculture's  contribution  to the
Gross Domestic Product; (3) the degree of industrialization in agriculture, especially
in the livestock sector; (4) the importance of agricultural exports; (5) the wealth and
income position of farmers; and (6) other factors that had shifted since farm programs
were  first  introduced  during  the  1930s.  These  reformers  concluded  that  such
developments  meant there  was no role-or  a  very  limited role-for the  federal
government in modem-day agriculture.  They also were very effective in getting their
view before the public with articles, foundation studies and editorials.
Early on, as these diverse  interests began to spawn legislative proposals  and
strategies,  it was evident Congress was consumed by concerns about program cost
and ideological content.  One reform strategy was to insert provisions to deregulate
agriculture in the omnibus Balanced Budget Act of  November 1995. The effort to get
this omnibus bill signed into law resulted in government shut-downs that lasted for
days at a time and ended with the President's vetoing the entire bill-not as a result
of the  agriculture  provisions, per  se,  but as  a result of the general  philosophy  of
government's role in society, as implied by the legislation.
76*  Reams of  Litmus Paper. Meanwhile, negotiations were underway to pinpoint
agriculture's share of the budget cuts required to meet the overall legislative objective
of balancing the budget in five or seven years. House Republicans began the bidding
with a $16 billion cut spread over five years. But, negotiations ended with House and
Senate  conferees  agreeing  to  a $13.4  billion  reduction over  seven years.  This
consensus limited agricultural spending during the seven years to about $43.2 billion.
The $13.4 billion cut was from the $56.6 billion that the Congressional Budget
Office (CBO) had projected as the  seven-year cost of extending the  1990 act. The
CBO published this baseline analysis in February  1995,  but its cost estimates were
based on economic  conditions projected a few months earlier.
Once the budget-reduction  target was set, the objective then was to find a set
of policies  that  met  budget and  ideological  constraints.  Some  proposals  met  or
exceeded  the  static budget targets  (including those  proposals  that  reduced target
prices or reduced eligible payment acreage and increased planting flexibility), but
they didn't satisfy ideological considerations. One Republican plan eliminated acreage
reduction programs and tightened deficiency payment rates, but most did not meet
the litmus test of those wanting  a deregulated agriculture-i.e.,  the  elimination of
short-term land-retirement programs  and an absolute cap on farm program outlays.
The Freedom to Farm Act (FFA) appealed to many because  it met both litmus tests
and, although the significance was not recognized immediately, it guaranteed that all
of  the $43.2 billion in "allowed"  farm program spending would be paid to farmers.
Early on, the FFA was not by any means embraced universally. Budget cutters
supported the FFA. Reformers  thought it was a step in the right direction, because it
provided  for production  deregulation and budget certainty.  Still, most farm groups
and many lawmakers with farm constituencies expressed reservations about the bill
and did not "sign  on."  And, compared to previous  farm bill debates, the  process
continued to include little time in considering the agricultural price and income effects
of the alternative  proposals.
*  "In This Light,  You Don't Look Half  Bad. "Then  a funny thing happened
on the way to farm bill enactment. Farm prices increased dramatically.  By July 1995,
House agricultural  committee chairman Pat Roberts (R-Kan.)  was ready to switch
from pushing for a modification of the 1990 bill to supporting the decoupled payment
approach of the  FFA. There  was  a good  reason  for him to do  so:  Congress  was
required to use the CBO's February  1995 baseline to measure "budget  savings."
Rep. Roberts recognized that with the FFA, farmers could market crops at high
prices, yet still receive government payments, as if  prices were low. Farm organizations,
farmers and others also began to see this incredible political opportunity to "capture"
baseline savings that at least would make agriculture considerably better off in 1996
and 1997 (when prices were higher than baseline projections) and probably, over the
entire seven-year period.
77Given this awareness,  the legislation  passed.  It passed even though the bill
actually  represented  no  budget  savings,  compared to  estimates for  extending the
previous legislation, plus the bill would result in large payments to farmers in years
of record receipts-results  seemingly  contrary  to the  aims  of budget  cutters  and
reformers. Thus,  it could be argued that what won the  day was the bill's effect  on
agricultural  income, not budget concerns or ideology.
I  say that  because  the  reformers-especially  the  Republican  lawmakers-
viewed  the production  contracts  as  compensation  for terminating  farm programs.
Thus, they were willing to pay the premium government cost for the seven-year bill.
On the other hand, many farmers and farm groups viewed the lucrative payments
of FAIR as a windfall  and not as transition payments. They believed the FAIR was
the  best deal  available  at the time and  that Washington will have opportunities to
revisit the legislation later-perhaps then moving it back, more to their liking.
In this regard, it  is important  to remember that much of what happened this
past year was done with very little legislative  debate.  O'Brien noted that the legislation
was  "more a  product of circumventing  the process than working through  it." The
Senate and the agriculture committees made little use of hearings and open legislative
drafting sessions. When Rep. Roberts was unable to get majority committee approval,
he received permission from House leadership to circumvent his committee by inserting
the FFA into the House Reconciliation Bill. (Special legislative rules were imposed
for  this bill,  however, that  included  a ban  on  the  introduction  of amendments.)
Similarly, during the latter stages of the legislative process, there was little opportunity
for open debate as the FFA and other FFA-like bills became the FAIR that was signed
into law. O'Brien  suggests  that the farm bill was  "largely  externally imposed and
leaves many issues  to be resolved in future farm bill debates."
Indeed, pressures for revisiting the legislation could emerge before the FAIR's
termination in 2002. Moreover, because the permanent 1938 and 1949 legislation was
not  repealed,  but rather  suspended  for  seven  years,  farm  legislation  must  be
reconsidered in 2002.
Next time, it may be more difficult to avoid a broader based, more open debate
that involves all factions. Even so, a deliberate decision must be made on what to do
with farm programs sometime before 2003. The alternatives include: (1) continuing
with a FAIR-like act, probably with annual reductions  in payments;  (2)  eliminating
farm programs  altogether;  or (3) moving  in a  completely different  direction.  The
decision will depend upon agricultural  interests' perceptions  of how the FAIR has
performed-and, as usual, on the economic and political conditions of the time.
How  Agriculture  'Fares' Under the  FAIR
The next  sections consider agriculture's performance  under the  1996 act,  as
compared with a hypothetical extension of the 1990 legislation. The comparisons are
78the result of analyses just completed at the University of Tennessee's Agricultural
Policy Analysis Center (APAC).
Baseline  assumptions for all analyses-including interest rates, input prices
and levels for a host of other variables-were provided by the Food and Agricultural
Policy Research Institute (FAPRI). These assumptions and their FAIR-based baseline
agricultural projections for 1996-2004 were published in May 1996. (In July 1996,
FAPRI released updated numbers for the 1996-98  crop years, but with no tie back to
the 1999-2004 numbers reported in the earlier publication.)
For  this  presentation,  the  baseline  FAIR  situation  is  a  combination  of:  (1)
FAPRI's  crop  supply and utilization  estimates for the  1996-98  crop years  and (2)
simulation results from our Policy Analysis System (POLYSYS) for noncrop-specific
economic indicators,  as well as for stock carryovers,  expected prices and so on for
1996-98. These POLYSYS results were then used to simulate changes from FAPRI's
May 1996 baseline for 1999-2004. Thus, the FAIR baseline is really an APAC simulation
after 1998. All other simulations-including extending the 1990 farm bill and alternative
assumptions about exports and yields-are based on APAC simulations,  as well.
*  National Changes in Acreage.  While previous  legislation was in force, it
often was said that farmers planted crops for the farm program, not the market. Thus,
it might be expected that under FAIR, fewer acres would be planted to program crops,
compared with plantings under an extension of the 1990 legislation (with no acreage-
diversion program in effect).
Our analyses show this to be true for some program crops (corn and cotton)-
but only to a very limited extent. And there is significant variation from year to year.
For 1997-2004 corn, total harvested acreage averages 1  million acres less under
the  FAIR than under  the  1990  act (Fig.  1).  This amounts  to about  a  1.3  percent
decline.  Harvested cotton acreage also is down slightly (200,000 acres, out of about
13  million  acres).  Soybeans'  harvested  acreage,  on the  other hand,  increases  1.6
million acres or an average of about 2.5 percent over the 1997-2004 period, compared
to acreage under the 1990 act.  Slight changes are seen in wheat acreage from one bill
to the next. Total harvested acreage for all seven major program crops  (corn, grain
sorghum, oats, barley, wheat, soybeans and cotton) is up slightly, relative to the 1990
act's acreage-about 400,000 out of 233 million acres.
In summary, a significant, but relatively small change in the mix of harvested
acreage of major crops can be expected as agriculture moves to complete flexibility
under the FAIR and away from the restrictions of previous legislation. Essentially,
we should see more soybeans and less corn.
Over  time  under the  FAIR, however,  (Fig.  1) the story  is  more  complex.
Depending on the time frame considered, for example,  corn harvested acreage rises
79(by 1  million acres to 75.3 million acres in 1997),falls (by nearly 3 million acres during
1998-2000), and remains the same (with 2003 's and 2004's roughly at the 1997 level).
Given  1996 prices, it is not surprising harvested corn acreage increases in 1997. As
we will see later, however,  prices do not remain at  1996 levels,  and their decline
causes  corn acreage to decline during  1998-2000. Then, in response to rebounding
demand and prices, corn acreage returns to  1997 levels by the end of the period.
Harvested  soybean  acreage  remains  reasonably  steady  across time.  Hence,
harvested acreage for both corn and soybeans is near  1997 levels at the end of the
projection period. But, relative to projections for the  1990 farm bill, corn acreage  is
down and soybean acreage is greater  over the entire period.
Wheat's harvested acreage increases by 2 million acres to total 65 million acres
in 1997; then it shows a gradual decline to 62 million acres in 2003 and 2004-about
the same as if the 1990 act were extended.  Cotton harvested acreage varies relatively
little over the period, ranging from 13.5 million acres to 12.9 million acres.
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Figure 1. National Changes in Harvested Crop Acreage,  1990 and 1996 Farm Bills,  1997-2004
U  Regional Changes  in Acreage.  Figure  2 shows average  changes  in crop
acreage over the 1997-2002 period under the FAIRAct and under a 1990 act extension
for all 10 of the USDA-specified production regions. Over the six-year period:
1. CORNAND SOYBEANS...
Corn Belt corn acreage averages 660,000 acres less under the FAIR
(out of 40+ million acres) than under a 1990 act extension. Soybean acreage,
on the other hand, is up 990,000 acres (out of 30+ million acres).
The  Lake States  lose an average  264,000 acres of corn (out of 13+
million acres). But soybeans increase by 350,000 acres  (out of 7+ million
80acres), compared to the acreage projected for the previous legislation.
The Appalachian region also shows increases in soybean acreage of
116,000 (out of  4.7 million acres).
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Figure  2.  Average Changes in 1990-to-1996 Farm Bill Acreage Over 1997-2004, Thousand Acres
2.  COTTON. . Average 1997-2002 cotton acreage under FAIR,  compared
to that under the 1990 legislation (not illustrated in Fig. 2), is down slightly
in all but two regions: the Pacific and the Delta. In the Pacific region, cotton
acreage increases by 32,000 acres (out of about 1.9 million acres).
3.  WHEAT.  .The story is mixed in the case of wheat. Compared to esti-
mates for extending the  1990 act, FAIR wheat acreage  in the Corn Belt,
Delta, and Appalachian regions declines from 1997-2002. Average  FAIR
acreage in the primary wheat-growing areas of the Southern and Northern
Plains shows some increase. As emphasized earlier, however, it is important
to  note  that wheat  acreage  declines  over time  under the  projections  for
either legislation.  For example, under the FAIR,  total Great Plains  wheat
acreage declines by 1.2 million acres during the 1997 to 2002 period.
81*  Crop Prices. Crop prices are not expected to remain at their "high"  1995-96
levels over the next five to 10 years as stocks build to more normal levels and  export
demand  growth  slows.  Crop prices  are  likely  to decline  through the  turn  of the
century and then recover somewhat-but not back to  1996 levels by 2004 (Fig. 3).
In the case of corn, the price declines from S3 per bushel in 1996 to $2.22 in 1999
and then eases back up to $2.57 by 2004. Wheat prices register $4.18 per bushel in
1996, decline to $3.23 in 2001,  and then increase slightly to $3.36 by the end of the
period-but  generally are relatively flat, beginning  in 1998.  Soybean  prices follow
the  same overall pattern  as  corn's
$7.00-  and wheat's,  starting out at about
.. Soybeans  . $6.70 per bushel in 1996, dropping
$6.00-  to $5.54 by 2000, and climbing to
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Figure 3.  U.S.  Season  Average  Crop Prices under the  prices I would use to make planting
1996 Farm Bill,  Dollars Per Bushel  and  investment decisions. and investment  decisions.
Compared to those projected for extending the 1990 act, corn prices under the
FAIR are  10  to 20 cents per bushel higher.  Soybean  prices  are  30 to  40 cents  per
bushel lower. These price shifts reflect a slight decrease  in corn acreage and increase
in soybeans, relative to the acreage  likely under the old legislation.
*  Net Returns to the Seven Major Crops. After coming in at $34 billion in the
1995-96 crop year, net returns above variable  costs for the seven major crops jump
to $41 billion  in 1996-97, due to higher prices and to $5 billion in payments under the
FAIR (Fig. 4).  As prices and payments decline over the projection period, however,
so  do net returns. They decline  nearly  $10  billion  by the 2001-02  crop  year. And,
while net returns increase after that, they finish the projection period at $36 billion-
$5 billion less than for the current crop year.
Under the FAIR, net returns to the seven crops are more than $12 billion higher
than they would have been if the 1990 act had been extended. The higher net returns
occur  in the first  five  years of the  simulation,  with the  first crop  year  (1996-97)
accounting for 41.7 percent of the increase.
*  Government  Payments.  The  right  side  of Figure  4  shows  government
payments  to farmers under the FAIR and under the old legislation.  (2003 and 2004
82FAIR payments are kept at FAIR's 2002 level.)  Under the extended 1990 act, virtually
no payments are paid in 1996, because crop prices were near or above their respective
target prices. Under the FAIR, on the other hand, $5  billion in payments are made to
farmers in 1996.  FAIR payments also are $4 billion higher in 1997. And, over the 1996-
2002 projection period,  $11  billion more is paid to farm producers than would have
been paid under the extended  1990 act.
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Figure 4.  Net Returns to Seven  Major Crops, Realized Net  Farm Income,
and Government Payments under the 1990  and 1996 Farm Bills
*  Realized  Net Farm Income.  The trend  in realized net farm income over
most of the projection period is upward, due mostly to increased returns to producers
of livestock and nonprogram crops (Fig. 4). In comparison with the 1990 act's expected
outcome, the FAIR's higher net income results from higher returns to program crops
during the early years of the simulation period. Over the tenure of the new legislation,
net income under the FAIR is $9.4 billion greater.
Exports:  A Wild  Card in Any  Analysis
Because  a  large  portion  of crop  production  is  exported,  export  levels  can
markedly affect the level and variability of crop net returns. Here, I want to address
the projected  export  value for major  crops under the  FAIR, within the  context of
recent  historical  crop  export  values. Next,  I want  to discuss briefly  the  impact of
changing assumptions  about China's corn imports and about the European Union's
(EU) wheat exports over the period. Finally, I want to suggest how farmn  programs can
affect the long-run and short-run demand for crop exports;  then I will evaluate how
the FAIR measures up against those yardsticks.
*  Expected  Crop  Export  Values  Under  the FAIR.  Figure  5 shows  the
historical value of corn exports back to 1980, as well as projections for 1996 to 2004
under the FAIR.  Export value data are calculated by crop year, rather than fiscal year,
to keep projections consistent with the historical data in Ray et al.
Using this corn graph, I want to make three points that are generally applicable.1. Contrary to what economists were implying in the mid and late  1980s, the
peaks  in export value tend to be associated with years in which prices are relatively
"high." The troughs tend to fall in years when prices are relatively "low."  For example,
peaks  occur in the 1980,  1983 and 1995  crop years, when corn prices exceed $3 per
bushel. Troughs occur in the  1986,  1992  and  1999  crop years,  with corn prices of
$1.50,  $2.07 and $2.22.
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Figure 5.  Historical and FAIR-Projected Value  of Corn Exports
Export values rise when a rightward shift in export demand increases price and,
hence,  the  product  of volume  and  price.  Conversely,  a  leftward  shift in  demand
reduces  prices and  value.  The  data  suggest that moving  the demand curve  down
with lower prices does not generate more export revenue. The experience of the last
decade  should leave  little doubt that grain export demand is price-inelastic.  In fact,
even though trade liberalization may have eased price inelasticity somewhat, I would
hypothesize  that major  grain exports  still are at  least as  and possibly more  price-
inelastic now than they were during the  1950s and  1960s. (And those decades were
a time when agricultural economists explained the existence of farm programs on the
basis of the inelasticity of demand and supply.)
For example, it is certain that Japan-both our major grain "demander"  and the
country with which we have the  largest trade deficit-will buy our grain  whether
world prices are high or low. So long as our grain is available, price won't matter that
much, because they need to trade with us.
The  overriding  reason for the  continued inelasticity  of grain  exports-and,
perhaps, of its increased inelasticity-is market structure. Either we are the dominant
player in the market (as with corn) or we are one of a few players in a well-developed
oligopolistic market structure (as is the case with wheat and soybeans). Within days
or  even  hours  of our lowering  prices,  the  marketing  boards of the  EU,  Canada,
84Australia,  Brazil  and  such also drop  their wheat  or soybean  prices.  This  reaction
leaves world market shares virtually unchanged.  Because the total volume of exports
is up proportionately  less than the prices decline, export earnings drop for all. Traders,
transporters  and input providers benefit from the increased volume, but U.S. grain
producers  lose revenue.
2. The steep climb in corn exports experienced between  1992 and 1995 will not
continue. I point this out specifically because I sense that farmners and others expect
corn  and other grain exports to expand dramatically  in the immediate  years ahead
and, with that, the prosperity of the  1970s and early 1980s to return..  ."but this time,
based on fundamentals."  Given the conditions in early fall 1996,  corn export volume
actually is likely to decline from its 1995 level through  1998; then it should recover to
its 1995 level in 1999, before increasing again in the early years of the next century.
Because projected prices fall during the early period and then recover more
slowly, the value of corn exports shows  an exaggeration of this same pattern.  And,
much  of the  increase  in export volume  after the  year 2000 is due  to an expected
increase  in export demand from China, which is discussed later.
While  crop-year corn export value  has  increased in recent  years,  it took  15
years to reach its 1980 value. Actually, the 1995 crop-year value (which was heavily
influenced by the mid 1996 run-up in prices) is slightly under 1980's value. Perhaps
even more surprising is that after 1995,  we may have to wait until 2004 to reach the
1980 (and 1995)  crop-year value of corn exports once again. A value of exports that
is unadjustedfor  inflation and merely equal to the value seen 24 years earlier seems
a shaky foundation for projecting a prosperous grain agriculture.
3.  The export-value  situation is nearly the same for soybeans, but is even less
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Figure 6.  Historical and FAIR-Projected  Value of Wheat, Soybeans,  and Cotton Exports
85The 1995 crop-year value of soybean exports ($5.68 billion) nearly equals its
historical-high 1983 level ($5.82 billion). After that, it generally declines until the 2000
crop year ($4.6 billion) and then gradually increases to somewhat less than its  1983
value in 2004 ($5.48 billion).
Although wheat export value for the 1995 crop year ($5.62 billion) is well above
recent years' levels, it is $1 billion below its record of $6.53 billion, set in 1983.  And,
wheat export value falls after  1995. Unlike corn's and soybean's value, however, it
does not recover at the end of the projection period. At $3.88 billion in 2004, it is 30
percent below 1995's export value.
In the case of cotton, the crop-year historical record for export value was set in
1994 at $3.13 billion. Figure 6 indicates cotton export value declines to $2.75 billion in
the 1995 crop year, drops to $2 billion by 1997 and then remains near that level for the
rest of the period. Hence, by the end of the projection period, both wheat and cotton
export values are about two-thirds of their 1995 or 1994 value.
*  Other Export  Assumptions.  Exports  are  always  difficult  to  predict-
sometimes because the basis for an individual country's trade decisions  are partly
economic and partly political.  The Soviet Union and European Union quickly come
to mind as past examples. And, in the decade  ahead, China and the EU may be the
wild cards-China  in case of corn and the EU for wheat.  So, the question  is: How
would alternative  trade actions by these trade partners affect U.S. agriculture?
As Figure 7 shows, China was a net exporter of corn until 1994, when it imported
4.1 million tons. China's corn imports are likely to remain near or below the 1994 level
through crop year 2000.  After 2000, however, China is  expected to double  1994's
level by the year 2002 and triple the 1994 level in 2004.
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Figure 7.  Historical and FAIR-Projected  U.S.  and China Feed  Grain Exports
86Whether China will remain a net corn importer is,  in itself, an open question.
So, the interval of possible corn trade numbers for China is extremely wide.
Recalling the increase in expected U.  S. corn exports that occurs after 2000 is
largely due to China, we ran a simulation that held the level of China's corn imports
at the year 2000  level. As can be seen in Figure 8, that change in assumption results
in corn prices'  remaining  relatively  flat  after the  year 2000-rather  than curving
upward, as under the expected  situation. In turn, corn prices  are down by 20 cents
per bushel in 2004.  And, over the 2002-04  crop years, corn farmers lose about $5.5
billion (a 9 percent reduction from what is expected for the period).
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Costs,  1996 Farm Bill and China Scenario
Another interesting export situation/assumption  concerns the EU. Our baseline
projections  assume  that beginning  in 2000,  the  EU will  be  able  to export  wheat
profitably without export  subsidies. This expectation contributes  to flat U.S. wheat
exports in the latter portion of the projection period and to wheat prices that continue
to drop through 2003.
To gauge  the effect  of the  EU  assumption,  we  simulated increases  in U.S.
export demand from 2001-04. Those increases bring the U. S. share of world wheat
trade back to its  1998-99 average.
Wheat  prices  and  net returns  increase  significantly  under  this alternative
assumption (Fig. 9). Wheat prices increase by 18 cents per bushel in 2001 and by 60
cents per bushel in 2003-04.  Over the 2001-04 period, increased exports and prices
loost net income  to wheat  farmers by more  than one-fourth  or $4.5  billion (a  27
percent increase).
*  The New Legislation and Export Demand.  Before discussing  how farm
programs in general and the new legislation in particular can influence export bookings,
87a few comments are in order on the sources of year-to-year export variations and on
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*  U.S. Grain Exports in the Short and Long Runs. Year-to-year variation in
trade volume is influenced by changes in prices, exchange rates, credit arrangements,
country-specific trade policies and a host of other factors. But, the overriding force
that drives annual variation around expected or baseline  trade-flows  is fluctuations
in grain yields  and production.  In the case of a country  that produces  a significant
share of its  grain needs, short-run  changes  in its  grain imports-above  or  below
"expected" levels-are largely dependent on whether it had a "good" or "poor" crop
in the current production  period.  Similarly,  changes  in our competitors'  available
"excess  supply"  for export-above  or  below  "expected"  levels-are  largely
determined by the size of our competitors' crop. Hence, the lion's share of the variation
around expected levels in export demand for U.S. grain is due to production shortfalls/
bumper crops, either in net importing countries or in countries that compete with us
on the export market.
Of course, expected or baseline U.S. grain exports are determined by population
(especially in developed countries),  per capita incomes (especially  in less-developed
countries),  consumer  preferences,  long-  and  short-term  credit  arrangements,
international  and country-specific  trading rules,  and other demand-related  factors.
On  the  supply  side,  our  dependability  as  supplier  is  important;  in addition,  the
agricultural  productivity  of our export  customers  and competitors  (whether  that
productivity is market or politically driven) can greatly affect U.S. grain export demand.
*  How Can Commodity Programs Affect Exports? In general, the short-term
availability of U.S. grain for exports can be affected by such farm program mechanisms
as  an acreage  diversion  or other  acreage/production  restrictions,  base  acreages,
buffer-stock  programs,  price levels that are relative  to competitors'  prices, exportsubsidies, and so on.  Some provisions affect exportable  supplies positively;  others,
negatively.  Base acreage planting requirements,  acreage or production restrictions,
and noncompetitive  prices  are  among  those  provisions  that reduce  exportable
supplies.  Buffer stocks could enhance exportable  supplies in times of  reduced domestic
yields or sudden export demand  surges.
In the long run, commodity programs can affect the long-term availability of
exportable  supplies  if farm programs  influence  agriculture's  ability  to create  and
maintain excess capacity. By and large, the level of  productive capacity of agriculture
is determined by technology. Thus, to the extent that farm programs provide a stable
price and income environment that encourages farmers and their bankers to invest in
new capital-intensive technologies, farm programs can expand the productive capacity
of agriculture.  But, maintenance  of diverted acreage that can be tapped on the basis
of the next year or two also can allow farmers quickly to capture a large share of an
export market that suddenly takes off.
So,  How  Does  the  FAIR Measure  Up?
In terms of ability to respond to export markets by changing the commodities
mix, the FAIR receives a five-star rating. Farmers are free to change crop mixes as
market conditions suggest or as export markets emerge. In part, the CRP also serves
as a store of excess productive  capacity that could be brought on line, if needed.
On the negative side, the new farm bill provides no commitment to maintaining
buffer stocks. Marketing loans continue  and are likely to be used to ensure little or
no accumulation of Commodity Credit Corporation-owned grain and cotton stocks.
The Farmer-Owned Grain Reserve is suspended;  so, no buffering is possible from it.
Short-term diversions also are not available to "backstop" a spurt in export demand.
Hence,  tremendous  variations  in  prices and  income  are  possible under the
FAIR.  Notwithstanding policymaker assurances  to the contrary, if early 1996 grain
production estimates  had materialized and if they had been followed by an event of
similar magnitude  in the 1997 crop year, there would have been a very good chance
that  export  embargoes  would  have  been  seriously  considered-and  perhaps
implemented. While a supply-demand  scenario as tight as that may not be "likely," it
definitely can happen.  And, whether  embargoes  became  real or only feared, the
result of such a tight  situation would be the same.  It would intensify the food self-
sufficiency goals of our export customers and encourage those customers to arrange
formal grain-delivery commitments with our competitors.
Even before the summer of 1996..  .that time when the price of corn shot up to
$5 per bushel and then fell below $2.35  within a five-month span..  .if  there was one
thing analysts could agree on about the new farm bill, it was this: The bill will subject
agriculture to increased price and income risk.
Also,  if there  is  any agreement  on how  firms  deal  with  risk,  it's this:  Firm
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order to produce the optimal mix of products in the short run. In addition, increased
risk inhibits the adopting and banker financing of new and usually capital-intensive
technologies.
Environmental Policy
Commodity programs  have been deregulated.  Will environmental  programs
that target agriculture be next?
In a word: "No."  It would be a mistake to believe there will be less emphasis on
the environment in the foreseeable future.
At the  same time, the FAIR's  environmental  sections now  allow for a  more
farmer-friendly implementation of enviromnental regulations by Farm Services Agency
(FSA)  and  Natural  Resources  Conservation  Service  (NRCS)  personnel.  Their
increased  flexibility in administering the  regulations  includes  the  ability to waive
penalties for a good-faith violation, when the operator agrees to rectify the situation.
The  standards  remain  unchanged,  but farmers are  given more  time and  technical
assistance for correcting violations. In the case of wetlands, farmers will have more
opportunities to substitute acreages  or in other ways mitigate wetland problems.
The  Role  of Public  Policy  Educators
What  is the role  of public policy educators  in this new era? With the virtual
elimination of farm programs as we have known them, some might argue there is no
longer any need for public policy educators. But I strongly disagree with this sentiment.
For many educators, commodity policy has never been the main focus of their efforts.
Environmental,  natural  resource, trade,  and  often  state and  local  policy concerns
consume the majority of time for a large  share of public policy professionals.  And,
that work will need to continue-most probably, demanding more and more time.
Nonetheless,  I firmly believe that teachable moments will be lost if we fail to
work with our traditional  commodity policy clientele  right now. In fact,  getting  a
good meeting turnout now may be easier than it was earlier, when the critical (although
often  trivial) farmer  decision was  whether to participate  in commodity  programs.
Either now or very soon, farmers are likely to be highly motivated to learn how to deal
better with the price and income uncertainty of the years ahead.
For example, for farm operators who want to stay with cash sales, an educational
program that shows the income consequences of following alternative sales schedules
might  be  in order.  An even  greater  opportunity  could  be  to  initiate  hands-on
workshops that give farmers an opportunity to learn and, where possible, use "paper
trades" to  practice applying  the  risk-management  techniques  available  to them. I
commend the Federal Public Policy Extension Service, Farm Foundation and others
who are building  a set of instruction materials  and sponsoring training sessions on
the mechanics of risk management.
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the nature of agricultural markets. After all, except for water (which costs little in the
United States),  food is virtually the only "product" we must regularly purchase and
consume-regardless  of price-in  order  to stay  alive.  Of course,  once  a  certain
amount  is consumed, no increase in consumer income or decrease  in product price
will  entice  people  to  consume  appreciably  more.  But  this  idea  (obviously
oversimplified here) helps explain the giant share of  price variability within a production
period-particularly when coupled with two other concepts:  (1) grain farmers'  lack
of opportunity  to alter within-year crop production plans  significantly and  (2)  the
inherent variability of crop yields, due to weather.
To help the problems of supply adjustment become apparent, add the following
ideas to the concepts  mentioned above:
1.  Productive  capacity is determined largely by technology-not long-term
strategic planning.
2.  Land and, to a lesser extent, other fixed resources usually stay in agricultural
production-not only in the short run but also in the long run, either under
the direction of the current operator or, if he/she goes bankrupt, a new farm
operator.
These characteristics of the agricultural industry are quite different from those
of other industries,  in which dominant firms: (1) gauge  current-year production, to
meet expected demand;  (2) develop long-term projections, to plan for future productive
capacity;  and (3) make  any necessary  sales of land,  buildings and  equipment to a
different  industry, rather than to another firm in the same industry.
As educators, we want to teach farmers the means to ameliorate the effects of
agriculture's  market structure. Providing information about the "whys"-why farm
prices  are  so  variable  and  why  aggregate  demand  and  supply  vary  so little  with
changes  in prices-can  build understanding  and further motivate  our  clientele  to
learn and use risk-reduction  strategies.
Also, there is a need for public policy educators to be the voice of reason. As
we speak, I believe a large number of traditional clientele "have expectations that will
not be  met and  will make commitments  that they will  regret."  Several things  are
driving this surge of optimism. As mentioned earlier, many farmers expect mid- 1996
or even higher prices to be the norm in the years ahead, due to accelerating  growth
in crop exports. This euphoria  is fanned by quixotic  expectations of how removing
the "shackles" of government programs will affect grain agriculture.
And, a tremendous amount of money is being pumped into rural communities
right now.  On top of what will be relatively large market receipts, farmers received the
first half of their 1996 FAIR payment last summer. They will receive the rest of their
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in December 1996 or (if they prefer) January  1997. This influx of cash-as short-term
as it is-tends to validate some farmners'  belief that agriculture has entered a new era.
How  our farmer  clientele  choose  to  use  their new-found purchasing  power
could well affect their long-term viability in agriculture.
When  farmers  have  money,  they  tend  to  invest  in  land  and to  purchase
machinery. And both are happening now. Land prices increased at double-digit rates
toward the end of 1996 (Benjamin).  Machinery  companies are adding third shifts at
assembly plants. If farmers make  such purchases with cash, there is little effect on
farm survival risk. Nonetheless, they remain subject to "bad business-decision risk,"
because  opportunities  may be lost-opportunities  that would have  added  more to
(or taken less from) net worth.
In some cases, of course, replacing depreciated-out, worn-out machinery with
new, more efficient machinery  can be cost-effective  and a good business decision.
Or, circumstances  may justify  adding  a piece of ground to existing property,  even
when the price makes the economics questionable.
There is no doubt, however, that many farmers who would benefit from a cash
cushion in years ahead will  decide  to use that money as  down payments-to buy
land, farm equipment, pickups, recreational vehicles or home additions. And, if such
decisions  are based on extending this year's  cash income  over the term of a loan,
problems may ensue.
Again, because  expectations about the export market probably are the major
reason for the general optimism, our job is to point out the realities. As we have seen,
it is very unlikely that exports are going to skyrocket in the immediate future. In fact,
rather than increase, export values for major crops are expected to decline over the
next few years and no more than to recover lost ground by the year 2004. So, given
the current risky environment, it is critical that farmer investments in fixed assets be
based on cash-flow projections  that are realistic  and err on the conservative  side.
Above all, we public policy educators must be independent thinkers. We should
be willing to question conventional wisdom.
With the best of intentions, we misled farmers in the early to mid 1980s, when
exports  began  to  weaken.  At  that time,  the  conventional  wisdom was  that  grain
exports had faltered  because price  supports  and  exchange rates  were making our
grain too expensive  to compete  in the world market. Hence,  our analyses  and our
policy prescriptions-both based  on the theory of perfectly  competitive  markets,
rather than  the actual  oligopolistic world  grain markets-promised  that lowering
price  supports  would increase  not  only quantities  exported  but also the  value  of
those exports.  Some of us went so far as to say that the increased export value would
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By suggesting that exports are exchange rate-elastic and price-elastic,  we reinforced
the belief that the heady export growth of the  1970s and early 1980s was long-term
and that relatively little was needed to put it back on track. We generated expectations
that influenced farmers to make  long-term decisions  based on unfilled promises of
future prosperity.
This time around, we have the opportunity to redeem ourselves by providing
farmers a more realistic basis for preparing for the future.
At a time when agriculture  has been proclaimed  to be entering a new era, we
need to think especially clearly about what is important or relevant in policy analysis-
and what is not. Obviously, changes in prevailing ideology or changes in the relative
strength  of interest  groups  should  not affect  our  economic  evaluation  of the
consequences  of a given  alternative.  Nor  can policy  conclusions  necessarily  be
drawn on the basis of changes in the organizational  structure of agriculture.
Analytically,  so long  as no  one  farmer  produces  a sufficient  quantity  of a
program crop to influence price, it makes no difference whether there are 6 million or
100,000  producers  of program crops.  What traditionally  has  been  of paramount
importance, however, is the nature of the supply and demand structure for program
crops. A fundamental  shift in the magnitude of supply and demand elasticities would
affect our analyses greatly. And, depending on the new values, a shift could indeed
set the stage for a new agricultural  era, devoid of excessively  gyrating  crop prices
and depressed farm incomes.
Thus, as analysts, we should focus on whether the demand for program crops
remains  as  price-inelastic  as  it has been in previous  decades.  . .or whether  it has
become elastic enough that the quantity demanded increases greatly  in response to
a small decline in price, therefore exerting a stabilizing effect on the market. Similarly,
we  should focus  on whether  the  elasticity  of supply has  increased  enough  that
farmers  promptly  and completely  respond  to price  changes  by moving  land and
other resources in and out of production,  thereby helping stabilize the markets and
prevent chronic  oversupply.
Literature  is  unavailable  to build  a convincing  case  that either  demand  or
supply has become price-elastic. In fact, a priori,  it probably would be easier to build
a case for greater price inelasticity, compared to what we saw decades ago.
For example-now,  as earlier-the  largest  use of corn  and  soybeans  is  as
domestic livestock feed. Until relatively recently, however, livestock was produced
in small units by individual  farmers,  many of whom were  "inners and  outers."  In
contrast, today a large share of livestock-almost 100 percent for some species-is
produced under some type of contract in fixed facilities that are so specialized  and
expensive that casual  shifts in and out of production are not economically feasible.
93In the very  short run, these large  livestock  concerns likely use  more sophisticated
procurement strategies than previous producers used. One way or another, however,
feed must be purchased.
Although shifting rightward as a result of health and preference  changes, the
domestic food demand for wheat and other grains in all likelihood remains the most
inelastic of all.  Surely the experience of the last decade has convinced (nearly) all that
the export demand for grains is inelastic. As mentioned earlier, I would venture the
hypothesis that grain  export demand  is  as inelastic  now as  it was  several  decades
ago, despite efforts to liberalize trade. On the supply side, while the complete planting
flexibility of the FAIR may marginally increase the direct- and cross-supply elasticities
for  individual  crop  acreages,  there  is  little reason  to believe  the new  bill  will
significantly affect the price elasticity of supply for all cropland. If anything, because
most of the land most  likely  to  enter and leave production is  in the Conservation
Reserve  Program, total program crop  acreage is likely to be more, rather than  less
price inelastic  than it was decades ago.
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